Conventionalism

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Conventionalism is the philosophical attitude that fundamental principles of a certain kind are grounded on (explicit or implicit) agreements in society, rather than on external reality.^{[citation needed]} Although this attitude is commonly held with respect to the rules of grammar, its application to the propositions of ethics, law, science, mathematics, and logic is more controversial.^{[citation needed]}

1 Linguistics
2 Geometry
3 Philosophy
4 References
5 See also

[edit] Linguistics

The debate on linguistic conventionalism goes back to Plato's Cratylus and the Mīmāṃsā philosophy of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.^{[citation needed]} It has been the standard position of modern linguistics since Ferdinand de Saussure's l'arbitraire du signe, but there have always been dissenting positions of phonosemantics, recently defended by Margaret Magnus and Vilayanur S. Ramachandran.^{[citation needed]}

[edit] Geometry

The French mathematician Henri Poincare was among the first to articulate a conventionalist view. Poincaré's use of non-Euclidean geometries in his work on differential equations convinced him that Euclidean geometry should not be regarded as a priori truth. He held that axioms in geometry should be chosen for the results they produce, not for their apparent coherence with human intuitions about the physical world.

Conventionalism was adopted by logical positivists, chiefly AJ Ayer and Carl Hempel, and extended to both mathematics and logic. To deny rationalism, Ayer sees two options for empiricism regarding the necessity of the truth of formal logic (and mathematics): 1) deny that they actually are necessary, and then account for why they only appear so, or 2) claim that the truths of logic and mathematics lack factual content - they are not "truths about the world" - and then explain how they are nevertheless true and informative. ^[1] John Stuart Mill adopted the former, which Ayer criticized, opting himself for the latter. Ayer's argument relies primarily on the analytic/synthetic distinction.

[edit] Philosophy

Conventionalism was adopted by logical positivists, chiefly AJ Ayer and Carl Hempel, and extended to both mathematics and logic. To deny rationalism, Ayer sees two options for empiricism regarding the necessity of the truth of formal logic (and mathematics): 1) deny that they actually are necessary, and then account for why they only appear so, or 2) claim that the truths of logic and mathematics lack factual content - they are not "truths about the world" - and then explain how they are nevertheless true and informative. ^[2] John Stuart Mill adopted the former, which Ayer criticized, opting himself for the latter. Ayer's argument relies primarily on the analytic/synthetic distinction.

The French philosopher Pierre Duhem espoused a broader conventionalist view encompassing all of science. Duhem was skeptical that human perceptions are sufficient to understand the "true," metaphysical nature of reality and argued that scientific laws should be valued mainly for their predictive power and correspondence with observations.

[edit] References

^ Ayer, Alfred Jules. Language, Truth and Logic, Dover Publications, Inc.: New York. 1952. p. 73.
^ Ayer, Alfred Jules. Language, Truth and Logic, Dover Publications, Inc.: New York. 1952. p. 73.

The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Henri Poincare
[1]
Mary Jo Nye, "The Boutroux Circle and Poincare's Conventionalism," Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 40, No. 1. (Jan. - Mar., 1979), pp. 107-120.